Our campaign says no
Ordinary members of the public should not be forced to obtain a universal Digital ID simply to access essential services, exercise legal rights or participate in society.
Accountability should start at the top
People who use public systems in an official capacity should have a secure verified identity that records the decisions and changes they make.
What this campaign is about
Governments regularly claim that Digital ID can improve security, reduce fraud and make services more efficient. Right First Time UK believes these claimed benefits should first be applied to public administration and public accountability.
Every person who exercises public authority should have a secure professional Digital ID linked to their official role, permissions, organisation and actions.
This would not publish every employee’s personal information. It would create a secure, permanent and independently auditable record showing who carried out an official action, what they did, when they did it and which authority they used.
Public Service Digital Accountability ID
We propose a secure professional Digital Identity for people working within government, courts, councils, public bodies and publicly funded services.
Verified identity
The system confirms that the person is authorised to act in their official role.
Controlled access
Staff cannot enter public administrative systems without using their verified professional identity.
Permanent audit trail
Official actions automatically produce a traceable, time-stamped record.
AI transparency
The system records where AI or automated tools contributed to a decision.
No anonymous alterations
Records cannot be changed or deleted without the action being logged.
Independent inspection
Regulators and investigators can securely examine the complete history of a case.
Who should be covered?
The requirement should apply to people exercising public authority, managing public money, handling official cases or accessing sensitive public systems.
National government
- The Prime Minister.
- Government Ministers.
- Members of Parliament.
- Members of the House of Lords.
- Civil servants.
- Special advisers.
- Government agency staff.
- Public body executives.
Local government
- Councillors.
- Council officers.
- Chief executives and directors.
- Planning officers.
- Housing officers.
- SEND and education officers.
- Social-care staff.
- Environmental-health officers.
Courts and justice
- Court and tribunal administrative staff.
- HMCTS caseworkers.
- Judicial-office support staff.
- Probation staff.
- Prison-service staff.
- Publicly funded legal contractors.
- Government legal departments.
- Enforcement officers.
Public services
- NHS decision makers and managers.
- Police personnel using case systems.
- DWP and Jobcentre staff.
- Child Maintenance Service staff.
- HMRC staff.
- DVLA staff.
- Home Office and Border Force staff.
- Regulators and ombudsman staff.
Contractors and outsourced services
- Private contractors accessing public records.
- Consultants making public decisions.
- IT suppliers with system access.
- Debt and enforcement contractors.
- Assessment providers.
- Agency workers in official roles.
- External complaint investigators.
Publicly appointed decision makers
- Inspectors.
- Commissioners.
- Regulatory panel members.
- Public-inquiry staff.
- Tribunal members.
- Independent reviewers.
- Appointed board members.
Public systems covered by the proposal
A public official should not be able to enter, alter or approve information within a protected public system without a verified, role-based professional Digital ID.
Benefits and maintenance
DWP, Universal Credit, PIP, Child Maintenance Service and related enforcement systems.
Tax and employment
HMRC records, Real Time Information, tax assessments and employment information.
Courts and tribunals
Case files, orders, bundles, listings, evidence, judgments and administrative communications.
Health
NHS records, referrals, administrative changes, access logs and authorised disclosures.
Children and families
SEND, EHCP, safeguarding, social care, education and family support records.
Housing and planning
Housing applications, allocations, repairs, enforcement, planning and licensing systems.
Police and justice
Crime reports, evidence systems, custody records and enforcement actions.
Immigration and borders
Visa, immigration, asylum, nationality and border-control decisions.
Complaints and regulation
Complaints, reviews, ombudsman investigations, inspections and regulatory decisions.
Every official action should leave an audit trail
A trustworthy public system must show the full history of a decision without relying only on handwritten notes, incomplete case summaries or the memory of individual staff.
| Audit information | What should be recorded | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Verified official | The professional identity, role and organisation of the person carrying out the action. | Prevents anonymous decision making. |
| Date and time | The exact date and time of access, alteration, approval or disclosure. | Creates a reliable chronology. |
| Action completed | What information was viewed, added, changed, approved, shared or removed. | Shows exactly what happened. |
| Previous version | The information as it existed before any amendment. | Prevents history being silently rewritten. |
| Reason | The stated reason, policy, evidence or instruction relied upon. | Allows decisions to be reviewed. |
| Legal authority | Relevant legislation, regulation, court order or delegated authority. | Shows whether the action was lawfully authorised. |
| Approval | Who authorised or reviewed the decision. | Identifies management responsibility. |
| Automation or AI | Whether software, algorithms or AI contributed to the action or recommendation. | Makes automated decision making visible. |
| Data sharing | What information was shared, with whom and under what authority. | Protects confidential personal information. |
| Cost and staff time | Where proportionate, the staff time, contractor cost and public spending connected to the action. | Improves financial transparency. |
How the system would work
Identity verified
The organisation confirms the official’s identity, role and employment status.
Access authorised
System access is limited to the permissions required for that role.
Action recorded
Every access, decision and amendment is automatically time-stamped.
Record protected
Previous versions remain available and cannot be silently erased.
Review available
Citizens, regulators and investigators receive appropriate access when legally entitled.
Public money and the cost of decisions
Public bodies should be able to explain how much money has been spent designing, purchasing, operating and maintaining Digital ID and related public technology.
Digital ID programme costs
- Development and implementation costs.
- Consultancy and contractor payments.
- Software licences.
- Cloud hosting.
- Cybersecurity.
- Maintenance and upgrades.
- Staff training.
- Public communication campaigns.
Case-level public costs
- Estimated staff time.
- Management reviews.
- Contractor involvement.
- Legal costs.
- Expert reports.
- Appeals and tribunal costs.
- Complaint investigation costs.
- Compensation and correction costs.
Benefits for the public
Clear accountability
Decisions can be traced to the official, manager or authorised system responsible.
Complete case history
People can understand when records were altered and why.
Earlier error detection
Suspicious, inconsistent or unauthorised actions can be identified more quickly.
Visible automation
Citizens can see whether a decision was made by a person, software or a combination of both.
Financial openness
Public bodies can be held accountable for waste, repeated reviews and avoidable mistakes.
Greater public confidence
Trust improves when public bodies can prove what happened.
Protection for honest public-service staff
A proper audit system is not only about holding staff accountable. It also protects staff who act correctly and follow their professional duties.
The system can prove what staff did
- Which information was available at the time.
- Which action the employee completed.
- Whether they followed the correct process.
- Whether a manager approved the decision.
- Whether another person later changed the record.
- Whether system failure contributed to the problem.
It can reduce unfair allegations
- Less reliance on conflicting memories.
- Faster complaint investigations.
- Evidence of correct professional conduct.
- Identification of training or system problems.
- Separation of individual mistakes from management failure.
- Better protection for whistleblowers.
What the public should be able to see
Public access should be proportionate. Citizens should receive enough information to understand their own case and challenge errors without exposing staff to unnecessary danger or publishing confidential information.
| Information | Access position |
|---|---|
| Official action reference | The citizen should receive a clear reference showing when an official action occurred. |
| Role or team | The responsible role, department or team should normally be disclosed. |
| Named official | Disclosed where appropriate, subject to lawful security, safeguarding and operational restrictions. |
| Reason and authority | The person should be told the reason for the decision and the rule or evidence relied upon. |
| Record changes | Citizens should be able to see important amendments made to information about them. |
| AI involvement | Public bodies should state whether AI or automated decision support was used. |
| Full security logs | Available to authorised investigators rather than published openly. |
| Private staff data | Home addresses, private contact details and unrelated personal information should remain protected. |
Essential safeguards
Public accountability must not create unnecessary risk for staff, victims, children, national security or active investigations.
Privacy and security
- Role-based access controls.
- Strong authentication.
- Encrypted records.
- Independent security testing.
- Rapid removal of access when employment ends.
- Automatic alerts for suspicious access.
Protected roles
Public-facing information may need to be restricted for some judges, police officers, prison staff, intelligence personnel, social workers, domestic-abuse workers and others exposed to credible risks.
Their actions should still be securely identifiable to authorised investigators and oversight bodies.
Independent oversight
- Regular independent audits.
- Clear complaint routes.
- Penalties for unauthorised access.
- Protection for whistleblowers.
- Published performance and breach figures.
- Parliamentary and regulatory scrutiny.
No secret scoring
- No hidden citizen-risk scores.
- No political or religious profiling.
- No automatic punishment without human review.
- No use beyond the lawful stated purpose.
- No sale of public-service identity data.
- No connection to private consumer tracking.
What this campaign opposes
We oppose a system that would:
- Require every citizen to possess a universal Digital ID to access ordinary life.
- Prevent people from accessing essential public services because they cannot use a smartphone or digital application.
- Combine health, financial, benefits, travel and personal data without strict legal limits.
- Allow hidden profiling, risk scoring or automated restrictions.
- Allow private companies to track public-service use for commercial purposes.
- Create a system in which citizens are fully traceable but public officials remain anonymous and unaccountable.
Campaign pledge
We say no to
- Mandatory universal Digital ID for the public.
- Exclusion of people who are not digitally connected.
- Hidden public-sector decision making.
- Anonymous changes to official records.
- Undisclosed AI involvement.
- Untraceable public spending.
We say yes to
- Verified professional identity for public authority.
- Complete and tamper-evident audit records.
- Transparent decisions and lawful explanations.
- Protection for citizens and honest staff.
- Independent oversight and inspection.
- Public accountability from the top down.
Identity must not become permission to participate in society
Digital services may be convenient for some people, but convenience must not become compulsion. A person should not lose access to employment, public services or everyday life because their phone is lost, broken, unsupported, hacked or unavailable.
What is the UK Government proposing?
The Government describes Digital ID as a way to prove identity and residency through the GOV.UK App and access services across government. Important design decisions remain subject to development and consultation.
Information expected to be included
The Government’s March 2026 explainer says the proposed identity document is expected to include:
- Name
- Date of birth
- Nationality or residency status
- A photograph for biometric security
The consultation also asks whether additional information, such as an address, would be useful.
GOV.UK App and public services
The consultation states that people would be able to log into the GOV.UK App, prove who they are and use the identity across different government departments.
This creates important questions about system availability, cross-department data sharing and what happens when a person cannot use the app.
Mandatory right-to-work proposal dropped
The original national proposal included mandatory Digital ID for right-to-work checks.
The House of Commons Library reports that this mandatory element was dropped following political and public opposition. The wider Digital ID programme has not been abandoned.
Digital verification services already exist
Digital identity is not limited to one future government app. Private verification companies already provide identity-related services for right-to-work, right-to-rent and other checks.
The official register allows the public to see certified services and providers.
Why people oppose compulsory Digital ID
These are the main civil-liberty, security, accessibility and democratic concerns raised in public debate.
Privacy
Identity data is highly sensitive. Linking identity to more services may increase the consequences of misuse, unauthorised access or incorrect information.
- Who can access the information?
- What information is recorded?
- How long is activity retained?
- Can departments link records together?
Function creep
A system introduced for one limited purpose can later be expanded to additional public or private services.
The public needs a legal guarantee that future expansion cannot occur quietly through policy changes or secondary regulations.
Cyberattack and identity theft
Digital identity systems and their suppliers may become attractive targets for criminals seeking identity details, photographs, credentials or access tokens.
Security can reduce risk, but no connected system can honestly be described as having zero risk.
Service outages
Phones break, batteries run out, apps crash, accounts become locked and government systems go offline.
Essential services must remain accessible during technical failures and cyber incidents.
Digital exclusion
A smartphone-centred service may disadvantage people who:
- Do not own a suitable device
- Cannot afford mobile data
- Have limited digital skills
- Have disabilities or accessibility needs
- Live in areas with poor connectivity
- Do not have standard identity documents
Cost and value for money
The public should receive a full breakdown of:
- Development costs
- App and cloud costs
- Supplier contracts
- Biometric technology
- Cybersecurity and monitoring
- Support for excluded users
- Lifetime maintenance and replacement
Incorrect identity information
Errors in names, status, photographs, addresses or linked records could affect a person’s ability to prove who they are.
A fast correction process and independent appeal route must exist before a system is widely relied upon.
Surveillance concerns
People are concerned that identity checks across services could create records showing where, when and why an individual used their identity.
The Government should state whether usage logs would exist and which organisations could obtain them.
Voluntary in name but compulsory in practice
A system may be described as optional while becoming the fastest or only practical route to employment, housing, banking or government support.
Genuine choice requires an equally effective non-digital route.
Public services and institutions have already been hacked
These verified incidents did not involve the proposed national Digital ID. They show that major organisations, suppliers and public-service systems can suffer serious attacks and prolonged disruption.
NHS WannaCry disruption
The WannaCry ransomware attack affected NHS organisations, disrupting computers, appointments and services. It remains one of the clearest examples of how cyber incidents can affect frontline public services.
Read the National Audit Office InvestigationElectoral Commission cyberattack
The Electoral Commission says hostile actors first accessed its systems in August 2021. Suspicious activity was identified in October 2022 and the attack was publicly announced in August 2023.
Affected information included electoral-register data and information held in the Commission’s email systems.
Read the Electoral Commission NotificationBritish Library cyberattack
A major ransomware incident compromised most of the British Library’s online systems and caused long-lasting disruption to digital services.
The National Cyber Security Centre has repeatedly used the incident as an example of the serious impact cybercrime can have on nationally important institutions.
View the NCSC Incident TimelineSynnovis NHS pathology ransomware attack
Synnovis, a pathology provider serving NHS organisations, was attacked by ransomware. NHS England reports that more than 11,000 outpatient and elective procedure appointments were delayed.
The incident affected laboratory capacity and disrupted services across parts of South-East London.
Read the NHS England Incident RecordLegal Aid Agency cyberattack
The Ministry of Justice and Legal Aid Agency confirmed a cyberattack against online legal-aid services.
Systems were taken offline and contingency arrangements were introduced. Updated guidance continued to be published during the restoration process.
Government IT can fail without being hacked
Cyberattacks are only one risk. Public services can also be disrupted by software defects, data errors, expired certificates, supplier problems, poor system design, failed updates and overloaded services.
Incorrect records
A system may work technically while relying on incorrect, duplicated, missing or outdated information.
Wrong information can be repeated across departments if systems are connected without effective correction controls.
Locked accounts
Fraud controls and automated security checks can wrongly block legitimate users.
People need immediate human support where an identity account is locked or disputed.
Supplier dependency
Government services may depend on private suppliers, cloud providers, biometric companies and verification services.
A failure at one supplier can affect many organisations at the same time.
Failed updates and outages
Software updates, configuration errors or network failures can make systems unavailable even where no attacker is involved.
Physical documents and staffed alternatives provide resilience.
Accessibility failures
Poorly designed apps may be difficult to use with screen readers, cognitive disabilities, motor impairments or limited digital experience.
Accessibility should be independently tested with disabled users.
Weak complaint handling
A person may be passed between the government department, app support team and private verification provider without anyone accepting responsibility.
One organisation must be legally responsible for fixing the problem.
What the public is saying
Social-media discussion is not representative polling. The themes below summarise recurring arguments visible in public debate rather than claiming that every person holds the same view.
Common concerns expressed online
Arguments made by supporters
Why social media cannot measure the whole public
Online discussion can be influenced by:
- Platform recommendation algorithms
- Political campaigning
- Automated or fake accounts
- Highly active minorities
- Different age groups using different platforms
- Posts receiving attention because they are controversial
Representative surveys, public consultations, elections and petitions provide different kinds of evidence.
View current public discussion
Search X
View current public posts discussing UK Digital ID.
Search Reddit
View discussion threads from different UK and privacy communities.
Search YouTube
View news coverage, parliamentary clips, campaign videos and public comments.
Search Facebook
Search public Facebook content and groups discussing Digital ID.
Petitions and Parliamentary opposition
Millions of people have already supported Parliamentary petitions opposing national Digital ID or asking for a public vote.
Do not introduce Digital ID cards
The Parliamentary petitions register records 2,984,191 signatures before the petition closed on 9 January 2026.
A large petition demonstrates substantial opposition, although it is not the same as a national referendum.
Hold a national referendum on Digital ID
This Parliamentary petition asks for a national referendum before Digital ID is introduced.
The petition is scheduled to remain open until 8 November 2026, subject to Parliament’s official petition rules.
Home Affairs Committee report
The Committee examined the Government’s proposals, the original mandatory requirement and the later change in direction.
Digital ID petition debate
MPs debated a petition relating to Digital ID in December 2025. Parliament provides information and links to the debate.
Government claims and campaign questions
A fair campaign should show the Government’s stated reasons alongside the questions that remain unanswered.
| Government argument | Campaign concern | Evidence required |
|---|---|---|
| Digital ID could make public services more convenient. | Convenience could make non-digital routes slower or impractical. | A legal right to use equally effective physical and offline alternatives. |
| Strong verification could help reduce identity fraud. | A compromised identity account could create new forms of fraud and wider harm. | Independent fraud testing, incident statistics and guaranteed identity-restoration support. |
| The system could help people without traditional documents. | People may struggle to enrol or correct their records without existing evidence. | Clear assisted routes, human support and appeal rights. |
| Digital ID could work across several departments. | Cross-department use raises data-sharing and surveillance concerns. | Published data maps, access logs, retention rules and legal limits. |
| Certified providers must meet a trust framework. | Certification cannot guarantee that a provider will never be attacked or fail. | Continuing audits, breach disclosure, insurance, penalties and supplier-exit plans. |
Minimum protections the public should require
Even people who support voluntary digital verification should expect strict legal, security and accessibility safeguards.
Questions the Government must answer
Announcements should be supported by legislation, technical evidence, costings and independent scrutiny.
Will Digital ID always remain voluntary?
Will the Government place a clear legal prohibition on requiring Digital ID for employment, healthcare, benefits, housing, education, voting, banking, travel or internet access?
Will physical documents remain equally valid?
Will public authorities and participating businesses be legally required to accept suitable physical evidence without charging extra or imposing longer delays?
Will identity use be logged and monitored?
What records will show where and when an identity was checked? Who can access those records, how long will they be retained and can the individual see them?
What happens after a cyberattack?
How will affected people be notified? Will identity credentials be replaced? Who will pay for fraud protection, legal assistance, financial loss and identity restoration?
What happens when the app or phone fails?
Can a person continue working, travelling or using essential services when their phone is lost, broken, stolen, uncharged or unsupported?
Which private companies will be involved?
Publish all suppliers, subcontractors, cloud providers, biometric services, verification companies, contract values and data-access arrangements.
How will incorrect information be corrected?
Provide a clear deadline for correcting disputed data and an independent appeal where government or a supplier refuses.
What is the full lifetime cost?
Publish development, procurement, licensing, cloud hosting, biometric, support, cybersecurity, accessibility, maintenance and eventual replacement costs.
Take peaceful democratic action
Ask questions, share verified information, contact elected representatives and take part in official consultation and petition processes.
Sign the referendum petition
Support the call for a national public vote before Digital ID is introduced.
Contact your MP
Ask your MP to support voluntary choice, offline alternatives, transparency and a vote before any compulsory use.
Track Parliament
Search debates, written questions, committee investigations and proposed laws concerning Digital ID.
Request transparency
Freedom of Information requests can seek recorded information about costs, contracts, security, assessments and decision-making, subject to lawful exemptions.
Official evidence, cyber records and public resources
These links lead to government, Parliament, regulators, the NHS, National Audit Office, National Cyber Security Centre or other official public bodies.
Disclaimer: This is an independent campaign page from Right First Time UK. It is not affiliated with the UK Government, Parliament, the NHS, the ICO or the NCSC. It opposes compulsory or unavoidable Digital ID while recognising that some people support voluntary digital verification. The cyber incidents listed did not involve the proposed national Digital ID system and do not prove that such a system would necessarily be breached. They demonstrate that public bodies, institutions and suppliers can experience serious cyberattacks and disruption. Social-media comments are not representative polling. Policies, petition totals, implementation dates and official guidance may change; readers should check the linked official sources for the latest information.